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Revocation of a Revoking Codicil: The
Renaissance of Revival in California
By GAIL BOREMAN BIRD*
The actions of testators are often bewildering to those left behind,
but perhaps no situation has produced the variety of interpretations,
now entombed as legal doctrines, as the case of a testator who makes a
will, then makes another will that expressly or impliedly revokes the
first, and then destroys this second will. If the testator intended to die
intestate, it is puzzling that he or she left the first will. On the other
hand, the testator may have intended the first will to control the devo-
lution of his or her property. If this is the situation, it is equally puz-
zling that the first will has been revoked. This latter incongruity may
be explained, howdver, by assuming that the act of revoking the second
instrument was intended to "revive" the first instrument.
The issue of revival velnon has stymied courts and legislatures for
centuries, producing a variety of conflicting rules and engendering
widespread confusion.I As early as 1850, California, following the lead
of England2 and some American jurisdictions, 3 enacted an anti-revival
statute,4 adopting the rule that the revocation of a revoking instrument
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
B.A., 1967, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1974, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law.
1. Roberts, The Revival of a Prior by the Revocation of a Later Will, 48 AM. L. REG.
505, 506, 521 (1900) [hereinafter cited as Roberts]; Zacharias & Maschinot, Revocation and
Revival of Wills, 25 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 185, 186 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Zacharias &
Maschinot].
2. Wills Act of 1837,7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., ch. 26, § 22. See notes 12-15 & accompanying
text infra.
3. New York enacted anti-revival legislation in 1829. 1829 N.Y. Rev. Stats. pt. 2, ch.
6, tit. 1, art. 3, § 53 (1829). Although its statute was worded differently from the English
Wills Act, the two statutes generally have been given the same effect. 2 W. BowE & D.
PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 21.55, at 444 (3d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as BowE &
PARKER]; Ferrier, Revivalofa Revoked Will, 28 CALIF. L. Rav. 265, 270-71 (1940) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Ferrier]; Roberts, supra note 1, at 511-12. Some American jurisdictions followed
the English model, while others, including California, adopted the New York version. See 2
BoW & PARKER, supra, § 21.55 at 443-44; Rees, American Wills Statutes: II, 46 VA. L.
Rav. 856, 891-92 (1960).
4. 1850 Cal. Stats. ch. 72, § 11.
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would not revive the earlier testamentary instrument. While the rule
has been criticized,5 an emerging body of case law suggests that the
question of revival is not resolved in California, particularly in cases of
partial revocation.
This Article first examines the history of the law of revocation and
revival, focusing on the development of these doctrines in California.
The Article next addresses the problems of partial revocation and ex-
amines the evolution of the California rule in light of the New York
cases that have influenced it. The Article then analyzes the inconsisten-
cies judicially grafted onto the California statutes, concluding that the
California statute should be replaced by the solution offered by the
Uniform Probate Code.
Revival in Historical Perspective
The historical confusion surrounding the question of revival un-
doubtedly stems from the division of jurisdiction between the common
law courts, which controlled devises of real property, and the ecclesias-
tical courts, which governed succession to personalty. 6 The Statute of
Frauds did not address the effect of the revocation of a revoking instru-
ment, 7 leaving the common law and ecclesiastical courts free to develop
their own resolutions of this problem.
The common law courts adopted a rule of "automatic revival,"8
based on the ambulatory nature of a will: "If the testator lets it stand
till he dies, it is his will: if he does not suffer it to do so, it is not his
5. Evans, Comments on the Probate Code of California, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 602, 611-12
(1931); Ferrier, supra note 2, at 271-76.
6. For a more detailed comparison of the common law and ecclesiastical rules, see 2
BOWE & PARKER, supra note 3, §§ 21.50-.52, at 435-37; Zacharias & Maschinot, supra note
I, at 188-92. See generally 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 993, at 640-43 (rev.
ed. 1979).
7. The Statute of Frauds did require that revocation be accomplished by some act of
physical destruction on the part of the testator or by some written will or codicil, or other
writing, executed with all testamentary formalities. Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 6
(1676). The statute neither provided any method for the revocation of a revocation nor
specified when a revoking instrument was to take effect. Roberts, supra note 1, at 506;
Zacharias & Maschinot, supra note 1, at 188.
8. See, e.g., Note, Revival by Revocation of a Later Instrument-Effect ofa Revocatory
Clause, 28 Ky. L.J. 227 (1940). The term is something of a misnomer because, according to
the common law view, the first will continues to have potential legal effect despite the execu-
tion of revocatory instruments during the testator's lifetime. If the later instruments are
destroyed or otherwise revoked, the former will remains unrevoked, and "revival" is unnec-
essary. See Zacharias & Maschinot, supra note 1, at 191; see text accompanying notes 9-11
infra.
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will." 9 Therefore, when a testator executed a will devising real prop-
erty to 4, then executed a later will devising the same real property to
B, and subsequently revoked the second will, the first will would re-
main intact and unrevoked. The second will was deemed never to have
had an effect, even for purposes of revocation.' 0
Thus, under the common law rule, "a will has no operation, till the
death of the testator. This second will never operated: it was only in-
tentional. . . . If by making the second, the testator intended to re-
voke the former, yet that revocation was itself revocable: and he has
revoked it."" Under this view, the later will would revoke the first
only upon the testator's death. Until that time, the first will would re-
main unrevoked, but subject to revocation by a later will.
By contrast, the ecclesiastical courts treated the revoking instru-
ment as effective, for revocation purposes, from the date of its execu-
tion. The fact that the earlier will remained in physical existence was
of no significance; it no longer had legal existence.' 2 Revival of the
earlier testament, however, was possible. If the testator subsequently
destroyed the later instrument, evidence of intent, including oral decla-
rations, was admissible to establish whether the testator wished the
prior testament to stand.' 3 There was no presumption for or against
revival in such a situation.' 4
These distinct lines of authority ended in England with the pas-
9. Goodright v. Glazier, 98 Eng. Rep. 317, 319 (1770).
10. Id. Whether the second will in Goodright v. Glazier contained an express revoca-
tory clause may be doubtful. Roberts, supra note 1, at 507-09; Zacharias & Maschinot, supra
note 1, at 190-91.
11. Goodright v. Glazier, 98 Eng. Rep. 317, 319 (1770). See generally 2 BowE &
PARKER, supra note 3, § 25.51, at 436.
12. See, e.g., Exparie Hellier, 26 Eng. Rep. 1256 (1754), in which the court stated that
the execution of the second will is a revocation of the first.
13. Revival of the earlier will therefore was possible if sufficient evidence was intro-
duced showing that the testator intended the earlier will to stand. In Usticke v. Bawden, 162
Eng. Rep. 238 (1824), oral statements made by the testator shortly before death were deemed
sufficient to establish an intent to survive. See generally 2 BoWE & PARKER, supra note 3,
§ 21.50, at 435-36.
14. See, e.g., Usticke v. Bawden, 162 Eng. Rep. 238 (1824); Welch v. Phillips, 12 Eng.
Rep. 828 (1836). It has been suggested that the difference between the common law and the
ecclesiastical rules resulted from the fact that the common law courts had jurisdiction over
real property and were necessarily concerned with the security of titles. In contrast, the
ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction only over chattels, where security of titles was of lesser
importance. In addition, chattels were administered by a personal representative who could
transmit good title to a purchaser, despite the possible invalidity of the will. Land, however,
devolved on the heir or devisee immediately and a purchaser from a devisee was not pro-
tected if the will was later deemed invalid. M. RHEINSTEIN & M.A. GLENDON, THE LAW OF
DECEDENTS' ESTATES 266 (1971).
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sage of the Wills Act of 1837,15 which established a unified scheme for
the execution and revocation of wills and testaments. The statute ex-
pressly addressed the revival problem, directing that "no Will or Codi-
cil, or any Pair thereof, which shall be in any Manner revoked, shall be
revived otherwise than by the Re-execution thereof, or by a Codicil
executed in the manner herein-before required [that is, with all testa-
mentary formalities], and showing an Intention to revive the same
.... ,,"6 In applying this statute, the English courts generally have fol-
lowed the ecclesiastical courts' rule that a revocation operates from the
time of its execution. 17 Hence, the revocation of a revoking instrument
will not operate to revive a prior will unless there has been a re-execu-
tion or a republication by a later codicil.' 8 Under the English statute,
the revocation of a revoking will results in intestacy; oral declarations
of the testator are inadmissible to establish an intention to revive the
revoked will.' 9
The response of American courts to the problems posed by the
revocation of a revoking instrument has been inconsistent and conflict-
ing, and there seems to be no doctrine that "carries with it the decided
weight of authority. ' 20 Moreover, the statutory solutions are not uni-
form.2 ' The common law and ecclesiastical views, and most conceiv-
able variations, are represented.22 It is not surprising, therefore, that
15. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., ch. 26 (1837).
16. Id. § 22.
17. 2 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 3, § 21.53, at 437.
18. This principle has been applied in both express and implied revocation situations.
The decision in Goods of Hodgkinson, 1893 P. 339, illustrates an implied revocation. In
Hodgkinson, the testator had executed an initial will leaving all his property to a friend. A
few months later, he made a second will leaving the real property he had recently received
under his mother's will to his sister. The second will contained no express clause of revoca-
tion. The second will was subsequently revoked. The reviewing court held that the first will
had been revoked in part and had not been revived. The second will was, of course, inoper-
ative, and the testator died intestate as to the real property. A similar result obtained in
Major v. Williams, 163 Eng. Rep. 781 (1843) (involving express revocation). See generally
Zacharias & Maschinot, supra note 1, at 192-93; W. ROLLISON, THE LAW oF WILLS § 161, at
300 (1939).
19. 2 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 3, § 21.53, at 437-38; Zacharias & Maschinot, supra
note 1, at 192-99.
20. Roberts, supra note 1, at 506.
21. See note 3 supra. For a discussion of the variety of American statutes on the sub-
ject of revival, see Rees, American Wills Statutes: II, 46 VA. L. REV. 856, 890-92 (1960);
Zacharias & Maschinot, supra note 1, at 208-15. The Uniform Probate Code, now in force
in at least twelve jurisdictions, allows revival under certain circumstances. UNIFORM PRO-
BATE CODE § 2-509. See text accompanying notes 126-33 infra.
22. See Zacharias & Maschinot, supra note 1, at 208-15. See generally, 2 BowE &
PARKER, supra note 3, §§ 21.54-.56, at 438-46.
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the courts of one jurisdiction, working with a single statutory scheme,
have had difficulty producing a coherent jurisprudence of revival.
Revocation and Revival in California
A California testator may revoke a will by a variety of statutory
methods.2 He or she may perform some physical act on the document
itself, such as tearing it or burning it.24 Alternatively, the testator may
execute a subsequent instrument with due testamentary formalities.25
If the later document contains an express clause of revocation, or con-
tains "provisions wholly inconsistent with the terms of the prior will,"
the earlier will is effectively revoked. 26 Because a will destroyed animo
revocandi, by physical act, is not susceptible of revival, 27 the following
discussion primarily addresses revocation by subsequent instrument.
California Probate Code section 75 provides:
If, after making a will, the testator makes a second will, the destruc-
tion or other revocation of the second will does not revive the first
will, unless it appears by the terms of such revocation that it was the
intention to revive and give effect to the first will, or unless, after such
destruction or other revocation, the first will is duly republished. 28
Essentially unchanged from its first enactment in 1850,29 the statute ap-
parently was borrowed from the New York anti-revival statute,
adopted in 1829.30 The purpose of the legislation was to resolve the
effect of the revocation of a revoking will and thus alleviate the confu-
sion resulting from distinctions between the ecclesiastical and common
law lines of authority.31 The result differs from both the common law
and ecclesiastical rules.32 Like the ecclesiastical rule, the statute appar-
ently gives a revocation immediate effect. 33 Unlike the ecclesiastical
23. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 70-76 (West 1956).
24. Id. § 74(2) (West 1956).
25. Id. § 74(1).
26. Estate of burg, 196 Cal. 333, 238 P. 74 (1925); see CAL. PROB. CODE § 72 (West
1956).
27. T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS § 92 at 474 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as
ATKINSON].
28. CAL. PROB. CODE § 75 (West 1956).
29. See 1850 Cal. Stats. ch. 72, § 11.
30. Estate of Hering, 108 Cal. App. 3d 88, 92, 166 Cal. Rptr. 298, 300 (1980); Ferrier,
supra note 3, at 266-67.
31. Estate of Thompson, 185 Cal. 763, 779-80, 198 P. 795, 801-02 (1921).
32. Ferrier, supra note 3, at 267.
33. The California statute, like the New York legislation, does not expressly state that
the former will is revoked instantly upon the execution of the subsequent will, but logically
the later will should be given this effect; otherwise there would be no reason to prescribe the
means to be followed to revive the earlier will. Seeln re Lones, 108 Cal. 688, 690, 41 P. 771,
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rule, the statute embodies a presumption against revival and apparently
prohibits the use of parol evidence to establish the testator's intent.34
The former will can be revived, according to the statute, only by
republication. 35
California's anti-revival statute does not distinguish between ex-
press and implied revocation;36 both types of revocation operate imme-
diately from the time that the subsequent instrument is executed.3 7 In
Estate of Bassett,38 the testator first executed a formal attested will that
left her entire estate to a friend. This will was found intact at her death.
It was alleged, however, that the testator had executed a holographic
will after the formal will, leaving all her property to her sister, and that
this holographic will had been destroyed by the testator with the inten-
tion of revoking it. The trial court permitted proof of the former exist-
ence and contents of the holographic will by the evidence of a single
witness 39 and ruled, presumably on the basis of the anti-revival statute,
that the testator had died intestate.
772 (1895); Zacharias & Maschinot, supra note I, at 210. For discussion of the California
cases dealing with this problem, see text accompanying notes 36-44 infra.
34. California Probate Code § 75 states in part that the "revocation of the second will
does not revive the first will, unless it appears by the terms of such revocation that it was the
intention to revive and give effect to the first will .... ." CAL. PROB. CODE § 75 (West
1956). The phrase, "terms of such revocation," was early interpreted by California courts to
apply only to a written revocation. See, e.g., In re Lones, 108 Cal. 688, 41 P. 771 (1895); see
also In re Stickney's Will, 161 N.Y. 42, 55 N.E. 396 (1899). Oral declarations made by a
testator at the time of revoking a second will to the effect that he or she intends the first will
to stand are not effective to revive the first will. In re Lones, 108 Cal. 688, 41 P. 771 (1895).
35. CAL. PROB. CODE § 75 (West 1956). Republication is not defined in the code, but,
in this context, it generally means re-execution of the original will with all of the prescribed
testamentary formalities, or the due execution of a codicil to the will. See gewerally ATKIN-
SON, supra note 27, §§ 89-90, at 464-68. Cf In re Stickney, 161 N.Y. 42, 55 N.E. 396 (1899)
(court suggested that an earlier will could be duly republished for revival purposes if testator
declared to the same persons who were witnesses to its original execution that testator now
intends it to be his or her will).
36. Revocation by inconsistent provisions sometimes is referred to as "implied revoca-
tion." ATKINSON, supra note 27, § 87, at 450. In fact, the statute does not mention revoca-
tion of the prior will, stating merely that '[i]f, after making a will, the testator makes a
second will, the. . . revocation of the second will does not revive the first .... CAL.
PROB. CODE § 75 (West 1956).
37. Estate of Bassett, 196 Cal. 576, 583, 238 P. 666, 669 (1925); Estate of Johnston, 188
Cal. 336, 341,344, 206 P. 628, 629-30, 631 (1922); see also In re Lones, 108 Cal. 688, 690, 41
P. 771, 772 (1895).
38. 196 Cal. 576, 238 P. 666 (1925).
39. Although two witnesses would be required to establish the contents of a lost or
destroyed will before it might be admitted to probate, the trial court ruled that the contents
of the will could be established by the testimony of a single witness to work a revocation of
the earlier will on the basis of inconsistent provisions. Id. at 577, 238 P. at 667. See notes
45-47 & accompanying text infra.
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The decision was affirmed on appeal. The reviewing court noted
that, in the absence of statute, a distinction may be drawn between a
subsequent will that contains an express clause of revocation and a
later will that impliedly revokes a prior will by virtue of inconsistent
provisions.40 In jurisdictions recognizing this distinction, the express
revocation clause is given effect from the time of its execution, thereby
revoking the prior will immediately. Revocation by a later, inconsis-
tent will does not take effect until the testator dies with the later will
intact and unrevoked. Under this view, if the revocation of the prior
will was express, a subsequent revocation of the second will cannot re-
vive the first, because there is nothing to revive; if the second will was
merely inconsistent with the prior will, however, its subsequent destruc-
tion would revive the earlier will.41
The court in Bassett refused to make this distinction because,
under the California statutes, a will is equally revoked by a subsequent
will containing provisions wholly inconsistent with an earlier will as by
a subsequent will containing an express revocation clause.42 The anti-
revival statute provides "in effect, that if the later will revokes the ear-
lier will by either method prescribed [by statute], then the destruction
of said later will does not thereby revive the earlier one; either method
of revocation. . . may be said, therefore, to take effect eo instanti with-
out regard to the time of the testator's death. '43 Both methods of revo-
cation, express and implied, have the same effect on revival: a
subsequent destruction of the revoking instrument cannot revive the
earlier will. Thus, when the testator in Bassett executed her ho-
lographic will, she caused the immediate revocation of her earlier at-
tested will because the two wills were wholly inconsistent. In addition,
the anti-revival statute prohibited the later revocation of the ho-
lographic will from serving to revive the earlier will.44
In Bassett, the holographic will itself had been destroyed, and only
one witness who knew of its execution and contents was available.
40. Estate of Bassett, 196 Cal. 576, 583-84, 238 P. 666, 670 (1925) (quoting Estate of
Thompson, 185 Cal. 763, 198 P. 795 (1921)).
41. Id. In essence, courts drawing this distinction are applying the ecclesiastical rule
when the revocation is express, and the common law rule when the revocation is implied.
The result of this distinction, that the express revocatory clause "becomes operative at once
though the remainder of the instrument becomes operative only at death," is anomalous.
Evans, Testamentary Revival, 16 Ky. LJ. 47, 48-49 (1927); see also Note, Revival by Revoca-
tion of a Later Instrument-Effect of a Revocatory Clause, 28 Ky. L.. 227 (1940). See gener-
ally 2 BowE & PARKER, supra note 3, § 21.54, at 442.
42. Estate of Bassett, 196 Cal. 576, 582-83, 238 P. 666, 669 (1925).
43. Id. at 583, 238 P. at 669.
44. Id.
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Prior case law had established the controversial rule that, when a will
containing an express clause revoking a prior will is destroyed by the
testator, its due execution may be proved by one witness for the limited
purpose of establishing the revocation clause.45 The Bassett court ap-
proved the application of this principle when the inconsistent provi-
sions of a second, holographic will had been subsequently destroyed by
the testator by physical act, animo revocandi.46 Therefore, according to
the court in Bassett, the trial court had properly allowed the execution
and contents of the holographic will to be established by the testimony
of one witness to show the inconsistencies with the earlier will and had
properly concluded that the decedent had died intestate.47
Problems of Partial Revocation
After establishing the principle that the execution of a subsequent
will whose dispositive provisions are wholly inconsistent with those of a
former will immediately revokes the former will for all purposes, in-
cluding operation of the anti-revival statute, the California courts con-
fronted several problems of partial inconsistency. It was unclear
whether, and to what extent, a second will would revoke a prior will if
its provisions were partially inconsistent with the first. It also was un-
clear whether the anti-revival statute would apply to an earlier instru-
ment if the later instrument were itself revoked.
Revocation by Partial Inconsistency
The effect of partially inconsistent testamentary instruments was
first examined in California in Clarke v. Ransom.48 The testator first
executed a formal will, making several small bequests and leaving one-
half of the residue of her estate to her brother and the balance in trust
for the benefit of her daughter. A few months later her daughter died,
and the testator executed a codicil bequeathing her entire estate, aside
from the original small bequests, to her brother. Included among the
bequests was a gift of one thousand dollars to a friend. Thereafter, the
testator wrote a brief note to the friend, stating that she wished to give
the friend her "watch, two shawls, and also five thousand dollars." The
45. Estate of Johnston, 188 Cal. 336, 206 P. 628 (1922); see also Estate of Thompson,
185 Cal. 763, 198 P. 795 (1921). For a critical analysis of this rule and a criticism of Califor-
nia's proof of lost wills statute, see Note, Wills: Proof of Lost or Destroyed Will as Revocation
of Earlier Will, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 164 (1927).
46. Estate of Bassett, 196 Cal. 576, 582, 238 P. 666, 669 (1925).
47. Id. at 584, 238 P. at 670.
48. 50 Cal. 595 (1875).
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note was offered for probate along with the will and codicil and was
determined to be a valid holographic instrument.49 Contrary to the ar-
gument of the proponents of the formal will and codicil, the California
Supreme Court held that the absence of express revocatory language
did not preclude the holograph from partially revoking or altering the
earlier instruments. To the extent that its terms were inconsistent with
those of the will and codicil, the holograph constituted apro tanto revo-
cation or alteration of the earlier instruments.50 Therefore, all three
documents were properly admitted to probate to be read together, and
the provisions of the earlier instruments remained in force to the extent
that they were not superseded by those in the later instrument. Clarke
v. Ransom thus established the principle that partial inconsistency ef-
fects only a partial revocation.51
In Estate of lburg52 and Estate of Danford,53 both decided by the
California Supreme Court in 1925, the court considered the point at
which partial inconsistency gives way to total inconsistency, and hence
effects total rather thanpro tanto revocation. In Iburg, the testator left
two wills. The first instrument left his entire estate to a friend and
named that friend as executor. The second instrument, which was ho-
lographic, did not expressly revoke the first, but left the entire estate to
the testator's sister. It made no provision for the appointment of an
executor. The trial court admitted both instruments to probate and ap-
pointed the friend as executor in accordance with the terms of the first
will.54 The sole issue before the supreme court was whether the later
will completely revoked the first, precluding the appointment of the
executor, or whether the two wills were only partially inconsistent and
hence should be read together under the principle enunciated in Clarke
v. Ransom.55
The court noted that under the revocation statute only total incon-
sistency gives rise to total revocation and that in doubtful cases "the
courts incline to preserve the contents of the prior will, wholly or in
part, rather than declare a total revocation by inference. '5 6 Neverthe-
49. Id. at 599-601.
50. Id. at 601-02.
51. Zacharias & Maschinot, Revocation andRevival of Wills Part II, 25 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 271, 275 (1947). This principle comports with the general rule followed in the majority
of jurisdictions. See 2 BowE & PARKER, supra note 2, § 21.43, at 411-13. See generally
ATKiNSON, supra note 27, § 87, at 450-53.
52. 196 Cal. 333, 238 P. 74 (1925).
53. 196 Cal. 339, 238 P. 76 (1925).
54. Estate of burg, 196 Cal. 333, 333-34, 238 P. 74, 74 (1925).
55. 50 Cal. 595 (1875). See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
56. Estate of Iburg, 196 Cal. 333, 334, 238 P. 74, 74 (1925).
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less, the Iburg court found that the second will totally revoked the first
will, relying on the principle that a later will that constitutes a complete
disposition of the testator's property must necessarily revoke an earlier
will in its entirety, including any nondispositive provisions of the ear-
lier instrument. 57 Therefore, although the second will did not mention
an executor, it effectively revoked the appointment of the executor in
the earlier will by virtue of its complete and wholly different disposi-
tion of the testator's estate. 58 Thus, under Iburg, the critical factor is
the dispositive provisions of the wills; if these provisions are wholly
inconsistent, the earlier will is totally revoked.
In Estate of Danford,59 the dispositive provisions of the wills were
not necessarily wholly inconsistent, but the court found a total revoca-
tion. As in Iburg, the testator in Danford left two wills. Both were
holographic. The first will made small cash bequests to the testator's
son, daughter-in-law, and grandchildren, left one quarter of the estate
to his sister, and one half of the estate to one Caroline Mason. No
disposition was made of the residue. The second will, executed two
years later, left $2000 to Mrs. Gross, $5000 to his sister, and the resi-
due of the estate to Caroline Mason. The court determined that
[t]he governing principle is, therefore, the intention of the testator. It
does not necessarily follow from the fact of the new will that full and
entire revocation was intended. The purpose may have been to make
supplemental provisions, consistent with the former will in whole or
in part, to dispose of other property, or to amend and alter the prior
dispositions only. Hence a complete revocation by implication will
not follow unless the general tenor of the latter will shows clearly
that the testator so intended, or the two instruments are so plainly
inconsistent as to be incapable of standing together.60
The court noted that the later instrument did not profess to be a
codicil and that its provisions were adequate to dispose of the entire
estate. The court concluded that, because there was nothing in the con-
text of the two wills to require their construction as one instrument, the
testator probably intended the later instrument to supplant the earlier
will, and that therefore the decision of the lower court to admit only the
second will to probate was not, as a matter of law, incorrect. 6'
57. Id. at 335-38, 238 P. at 75-76.
58. Id. at 338, 238 P. at 76. The decision in Iburg was overturned in 1931 by an
amendment to California Probate Code § 72. 1931 Cal. Stats. ch. 281, § 72. Under the
amendment, the former will's designation of an executor will be given effect if the court
should decide that the testator so intended. See Estate of Salmonski, 38 Cal. 2d 199, 238
P.2d 966 (1951).
59. 196 Cal. 339, 238 P. 76 (1925).
60. Id. at 342, 238 P. at 77.
61. Id. at 343, 238 P. at 78.
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Under California law, therefore, if two wills contain wholly incon-
sistent dispositive provisions, or if there is some other indication that
the testator intended the later will to supplant the earlier, then the ear-
lier will shall be deemed to be revoked as of the date of execution of the
later instrument. 62 When the wills are only partially inconsistent, how-
ever, the two instruments will be read together, giving effect to the
terms of the prior will so far as they are consistent with the provisions
of the later will. Only those provisions of the prior will that are incon-
sistent with the terms of the later will shall be revoked.63
Revival of a Partially Revoked Will
The subsequent revocation of a later wholly inconsistent instru-
ment will not serve to revive the earlier will in the absence of republica-
tion or re-execution. 64 The effect given the revocation of a later
instrument that is only partially inconsistent with an earlier will, how-
ever, must be determined. If the earlier will is deemed to have been
partially revoked at the time of the execution of the later will, and by
virtue of Probate Code section 72, a subsequent revocation of the later
instrument does not revive those revoked portions of the earlier will,
the result is partial intestacy. This view has been adopted by the courts
of New York.65 California courts, however, seeking to prevent intes-
tacy and generally attempting to effect testators' intentions, have de-
vised a different approach using principles found in earlier New York
cases.
66
The New York Precedents
Until its revision in 1966, the New York anti-revival statute67 was
62. Estate of Bassett, 196 Cal. 576, 238 P. 666 (1925); Estate of Danford, 196 Cal. 339,
238 P. 76 (1925); Estate of Iburg, 196 Cal. 333, 238 P. 74 (1925).
63. Clarke v. Ransom, 50 Cal. 595 (1875).
64. Estate of Bassett, 196 Cal. 576, 238 P. 666 (1925).
65. See notes 67-85 & accompanying text infra.
66. See notes 86-110 & accompanying text infra.
67. Section 41 of the New York Decedent Estate Law was a verbatim restatement of
New York's original anti-revival statute, enacted in 1829. It read as follows: "If, after the
making of any will, the testator shall duly make and execute a second will, the destruction,
canceling or revocation of such second will, shall not revive the first will, unless it appear by
the terms of such revocation, that it was his intention to revive and give effect to his first will;
or unless after such destruction, canceling or revocation, he shall duly republish his first
will." 1829 N.Y. Rev. Stats. pt. 2, ch. 6, tit. 1, art. 3, § 53.
The present New York anti-revival statute provides: "(a) If after executing a will the
testator executes a later will which revokes or alters the prior one, a revocation of the later
will does not, of itself, revive the prior will or any provision thereof. (b) A revival of a prior
will or of one or more of its provisions may be effected by: (1) The execution of a codicil
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similar to California Probate Code section 75;68 on most questions of
construction and application of the statute, California and New York
courts wzre in accord.69 The question of the revival of a partially re-
voked will, however, has produced differing responses.
The leading New York case addressing this question is Osburn v.
Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Company,70 decided in 1913. The testa-
tor had duly executed a will and subsequently had executed a separate
codicil that modified the original will "by making an additional be-
quest of one thousand dollars before creating and providing for a resid-
uary estate. '71 She later intentionally destroyed the codicil, but the
original will was found intact at her death. The court recognized that
the revocation of the codicil would not revoke the underlying will,72
but concluded that the revocation also could not revive those portions
of the will that had been revoked by the execution of the codicil:
When the codicil modified the will by providing for an additional
legacy before creation of the residuary estate it modified and revoked
the will to that extent. This revocation was consummated at the mo-
ment when the codicil was executed and published and thereafter the
will was to that extent annulled. After this revocation had thus been
consummated by the execution of the codicil the will could not
be restored to its original form and tenor simply by the revocation of
the codicil. A revocation of the revocation could not thus be
accomplished. 73
Thus, the testator died intestate as to one thousand dollars.74
which in terms incorporates by reference such prior will or one or more of its provisions.
(2) A writing declaring the revival of such prior will or of one or more of its provisions,
which is executed and attested in accordance with the formalities prescribed by this article
for the execution and attestation of a will. (3) A republication of such prior will, whether to
the original witnesses or to new witnesses, which shall require a re-execution and re-attesta-
tion of the prior will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by 3-2.1." N.Y. EST.,
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-4.6 (McKinney 1981).
68. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
69. Both courts have indicated that: (1) an effective revocatory instrument operates
immediately on execution, regardless of whether the revocation was express or implied, Es-
tate of Bassett, 196 Cal. 576, 238 P. 666 (1925); In re Ford's Will, 135 Misc. 630, 239 N.Y.
Supp. 252 (1930); (2) once revoked by a subsequent instrument, a will cannot be revived by
oral declarations of the testator at the time of the later revocation, In re Lones, 108 Cal. 688,
41 P. 771 (1895); In re Stickney's Will, 161 N.Y. 42, 55 N.E. 396 (1899); and (3) the estab-
lishment of the contents of a subsequent will for the purpose of showing the revocation of an
earlier instrument may be shown by the testimony of one witness, Estate of Johnston, 188
Cal. 336, 206 P. 628 (1922); In re Wear's Will, 131 App. Div. 875, 116 N.Y. Supp. 304 (1909).
See also Zacharias & Maschinot, supra note 1, at 108-10.
70. 209 N.Y. 54, 102 N.E. 571 (1913).
71. Id. at 56, 102 N.E. at 572.
72. Id. at 56-58, 102 N.E. at 572-73.
73. Id. at 58, 102 N.E. at 573.
74. Id.
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The rule established in Osburn became firmly entrenched in subse-
quent New York decisions,75 and is codified in the current version of
New York's anti-revival statute.76 The court in Osburn, however,
neither expressly mentioned the anti-revival statute nor referred to two
earlier New York decisions that suggested a different approach.
InIn re Simpson,77 decided in 1878, the testator had duly executed
a will and subsequently had executed a codicil, which substantially
modified the testamentary plan. He later revoked the codicil.78 It was
conceded that the execution of the codicil revoked the will by implica-
tion because the provisions of the codicil were inconsistent with those
of the will, and it was argued that the revocation of the codicil could
not operate to revive the provisions of the will that had been revoked
by it.79
However, the New York anti-revival statute then in effect, like the
anti-revival statute in California, spoke only of wills80 and did not ex-
pressly refer to the subsequent execution of a codicil. Although the
issue was rendered moot by the ultimate decision in the case, 81 the
court refused to give an unqualified assent to the argument that the
anti-revival statute applied to the revocation of a codicil. The court
recognized that the statutory definition of the term "will" expressly en-
compassed codicils, but nonetheless declared that the anti-revival stat-
ute did not require that the phrase "second will" be construed to
include a codicil to the first will in every case.82 On this basis, the court
75. See, e.g., In re Moffat's Estate, 5 Misc. 2d 991, 158 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1956); In re Hill's
Estate, 176 Misc. 774, 29 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1941); In re De Coster's Will, 150 Misc. 807, 270
N.Y.S. 244 (1934); In re Kathan's Will, 141 N.Y.S. 705 (1913);see also Application of Shinn,
7 Misc. 2d 623, 158 N.Y.S. 2d 921 (1956).
76. See note 67 supra.
77. 56 How. Pr. 125 (N.Y. 1878).
78. The first will left the testators entire estate to his wife. Thereafter, the wife became
seriously ill and was not expected to survive. At this point, the testator executed the codicil,
leaving half of his estate to collateral relatives and charities. Later, his wife recovered and
the testator destroyed the codicil. Id. at 126-27.
79. Id. at 128.
80. "If after the making of any will, the testator shall duly make and execute a second
will, the... revocation of such second will shall not revive the first will .. " 1829 N.Y.
Rev. Stats. pt. 2, ch. 6, tit. 1, art. 3, § 53.
81. The court ultimately concluded that the original will had been effectively repub-
lished after the destruction of the codicil. In re Simpson, 56 How. Pr. 125, 142-43 (N.Y.
1878).
82. The court observed that the statute "evidently refers to a testamentary instrument
which assumes to dispose of the testator's entire estate, and not to an instrument which is
merely an addition or supplement to a former will; and which has no legal entity independ-
ent of the existence of the latter.... If this is so then the rule of the common law is still in
force in this state, which holds that the destruction of a codicil which only by implication
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concluded that the revocation of the codicil by the testator would have
left the original will "in full force and effect to the same extent as if the
codicil had never been executed." 83
Similarly, in In re Johnston's Will,8 4 the court concluded that the
anti-revival statute should not apply to an instrument that was at most
a codicil, and admitted the testator's original will to probate in its en-
tirety.85 Although the authority of Simpson and Johnston has been ef-
fectively overruled by Osburn and the revision of the New York anti-
revival statute, these cases have had a profound effect on the California
courts' attitude towards the problem of revival in partial revocation
cases.
Partial Revocation in California
The interplay between California's anti-revival statute and the
principle of partial implied revocation was first treated by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Estate of Schnoor.86 In Schnoor, the testator had
initially executed a holographic will leaving her entire estate, both real
and personal, to Mrs. Vinson. Two years later, she executed a second
holographic will that made several bequests of personal property, and
left the residue of the estate to Mrs. Vinson. The second will did not
expressly revoke the earlier instrument. Shortly after making the sec-
ond will, the testator destroyed it.87
The testator's heirs contended that both wills had been effectively
revoked and that the decedent therefore had died intestate. The court
suggested that, if the second will constituted a revocation of the first,
revival of the first will would be precluded by Probate Code section 75.
As framed by the court, therefore, the issue was whether the execution
of the second will constituted a revocation of the first.88 The court first
noted that the dispositive provisions of the two instruments were not
"wholly inconsistent" and hence the earlier will had not been revoked
revoked a former will in part by inconsistent provisions, does, ipsofacto revive the revoked
portions of the will." Id. at 131-32.
83. Id. at 132.
84. 76 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 157, 23 N.Y.S. 355 (1893).
85. Id. at 160-61, 23 N.Y.S. at 357-58. In Johnston, the testator duly executed a will,
which left his property to various relatives, including a niece. Later, he executed a new will,
which he stated was to be an "alteration of his will." This document did not expressly
revoke the first, but left all his property to his niece. Subsequently the testator destroyed the
second instrument. The court held that the second instrument was at most a codicil and
that, on its revocation, the first instrument was revived.
86. 4 Cal. 2d 590, 51 P.2d 424 (1935).
87. Id. at 590-91, 51 P.2d at 425.
88. Id. at 591, 51 P.2d at 425.
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in its entirety. 9 The court then applied the principle of construction
that " '[s]everal testamentary instruments executed by the same testator
are to be taken and construed together as one instrument,' "90 and con-
strued the second holographic instrument as a codicil to the first.
"[T]he second will gave to Mrs. Vinson exactly what she would have
received if the new provisions had been drafted as a codicil." 9' Having
made this determination, the court simply concluded that the second
instrument was a codicil; its execution, therefore, did not revoke the
first will.92
The court failed to consider the possibility that the earlier will had
been partially revoked by the second instrument, whether the second
instrument were denominated a will or a codicil, and hence did not
address the application of California Probate Code section 75 to a case
of partial revocation. Implicit in the court's holding, however, is the
suggestion that a codicil should be treated differently from a will for
purposes of revival, a treatment suggested in the early New York case,
In re Simpson.93
A similar result obtained in Estate of Shute.94 By her first ho-
lographic will, Mrs. Shute left twenty-five dollars a month to her
brother-in-law "while he needs it," and the rest of her estate to her
brother and three sisters. By a later will, she again left twenty-five dol-
lars a month to her brother-in-law, but changed the phrase "while he
needs it" to "during his life." Also added to this second will were vari-
ous specific and pecuniary bequests to certain friends and relatives. A
final change was a provision giving her brother twenty-five dollars a
month for life in lieu of a share in the residue, which was left to the
testator's three sisters. The second will was not in existence at the testa-
89. Thus, Estate of Iburg, 196 Cal. 333, 238 P. 74 (1925), was easily distinguishable,
because in that case the dispositive provisions of the two instruments were completely differ-
ent from one another. Estate of Danford, 196 Cal. 339, 238 P. 76 (1925), presented a more
difficult problem because the court in Danford had viewed the fact that the second will made
a complete disposition of the estate as indicative of a complete revocation of the first. See
text accompanying notes 60-61 supra. The Schnoor court concluded that in Danford nothing
in the context of the two wills required them to be considered as one instrument, and im-
plied that such compelling considerations were present in the instant case. The court, how-
ever, failed to specify what those considerations or factors were. Estate of Schnoor, 4 Cal. 2d
590, 592-93, 51 P.2d 424, 426 (1935).
90. Estate of Schnoor, 4 Cal. 2d 590, 592, 51 P.2d 424, 425 (1935) (quoting CAL. PROB.
CODE § 101 (West 1956); see aso Clarke v. Ransom, 50 Cal. 595 (1875); see text accompany-
ing notes 50-51 supra.
91. Estate of Schnoor, 4 Cal. 2d 590, 592, 51 P.2d 424, 425 (1935).
92. Id. at 592, 51 P.2d at 425-26.
93. 56 How. Pr. 125 (N.Y. 1878).
94. 55 Cal. App. 2d 573, 131 P.2d 54 (1942).
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tor's death.95 The trial court found that the second will had completely
revoked the first, that the second will had itself been revoked by the
testator, and that, because of the anti-revival doctrine, the testator had
died intestate.96 The appellate court disagreed.
As in Schnoor, the appellate court framed the issue in terms of
total inconsistency and hence total revocation. 97 The court indicated
that the mere fact that the second will makes a complete disposition of
the property does not necessarily control.98 What was controlling, ac-
cording to the court, was whether the execution of the second will had
the effect of revoking the first will, that is, whether the two wills were
wholly inconsistent within the meaning of Probate Code section 72.99
After reviewing the provisions of the two wills, the court concluded
that, "[glenerally speaking, the provisions of the second will were not
inconsistent with those of the first insofar as nearly three-fourths of the
estate is concerned,"100 and that, as in Schnoor, the second instrument
was in effect a codicil, whose execution did not revoke the first will.10'
The court did not address the problem of partial revocation be-
cause it treated the earlier will as valid in its entirety, including those
portions that were inconsistent with the later instrument. The court's
holding suggests, however, that a codicil, at least for the purposes of
implied revocation, should be treated as wholly ambulatory, and that
the partial revocation that arises because of inconsistencies between the
codicil and the earlier will does not take effect until the testator dies
95. If a will was last known to be in the testator's possession and is not found at his
death, a presumption arises that the testator destroyed it with the intention to revoke. AT-
KINSON, supra note 27, § 97, at 509. That presumption was evidently not rebutted in the
Shute case.
96. Estate of Shute, 55 Cal. App. 2d 573, 574, 131 P.2d 54, 55 (1942).
97. "The specific question is whether the second will contains provisions which are
wholly inconsistent with the terms of the prior will." d. at 575, 131 P.2d at 55.
98. "[I]n many cases where both wills are offered for probate the controlling factor is
not whether a revocation results from the inconsistent provisions in the second will, but it is
the fact that the second will is the last will of the decedent." Id. at 576, 131 P.2d at 56. This
statement accords with Professor Atkinson's suggestion that, if the testator executes two in-
consistent wills and the second disposes of all of the testator's property, it necessarily nulli-
fies the effect of the first. "If the wills are entirely inconsistent, only the latter can stand.
This result can be accounted for upon a mechanical basis, and it is not necessary to place the
cases of total inconsistency upon the ground that the testator has demonstrated his intention
to revoke the first will because of the provisions of the second." ATKINSON, supra note 27,
§ 87, at 450. Atkinson's theory, however, is not consistent with the California statute, which
indicates that an actual revocation occurs by virtue of inconsistent provisions. CAL. PROB.
CODE § 72 (West 1956).
99. Estate of Shute, 55 Cal. App. 2d 573, 577, 131 P.2d 54, 57 (1942).
100. Id. at 578, 131 P.2d at 57.
101. Id.
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with the codicil intact and unrevoked.10 2
Following the decisions in Schnoor and Shute, the issue of partial
revocation and revival remained dormant in California for almost forty
years. Recently, the California Court of Appeal undertook to clarify
California law on this question in Estate ofHering.10 3 By his first will,
Hering left the bulk of his estate in trust, naming Elaine Bockin as the
life income beneficiary and giving the trustee a power to invade the
principal for her benefit. The remainder interest in the trust was to be
distributed to the Braille Institute of America. A few months later, the
testator executed a "First Codicil" to this will. The codicil referred to
the various provisions of the will containing Bockin's name and
amended those provisions by deleting Bockin and inserting the name of
Evelyn Salib. The testator subsequently revoked the codicil.1°4
The trial court determined that the provisions relating to Elaine
Bockin in the original will had been revoked by the execution of the
codicil and that, because of Probate Code section 75, the subsequent
revocation of the codicil did not revive or reinstate those provisions.
The trust provisions were therefore inoperative, and the property in-
tended to be in trust should thus pass immediately to the Braille
Institute. 0 5
The appellate court reversed, holding that the anti-revival statute
should not apply in the case of a revoked codicil that does not revoke
an entire will. Relying primarily on the New York decision, In re
Simpson,10 6 the court noted that Probate Code section 75 is phrased in
terms of the revocation of a subsequent "will" and determined that the
statute was not intended to apply in the case of a revocation of a codi-
cil. Although Civil Code section 14 states that "[tihe word 'will' in-
102. At the end of the opinion, the court stated: "The decedent having intentionally
revoked an instrument which was in practical effect a codicil, no inconsistency remains
which nullifies any part of the first will and the same should be accepted as the last will of
the decedent." Id. at 579, 131 P.2d at 57. It should be noted that, when the anti-revival
statute is not at issue, California courts generally hold that a second will disposing of all of
the testator's property will revoke a former will by inconsistency. Thus, the Schnoor and
Shute cases have been deemed aberrational. See French & Fletcher, .4 Comparison of the
Uniform Probate Code and California Law with respect to the Law of Wills, in COMPARATIVE
PROBATE LAW STUDIES 331, 345-46 & n.49 (1976).
103. 108 Cal. App. 3d 88, 166 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1980).
104. Id. at 90, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 298-99. The attorney who prepared this codicil testified
that the decedent believed that revocation of the codicil would reinstate the provisions of the
original will. The trial court subsequently struck this testimony, ruling it inadmissible. The
appellate court's opinion did not discuss the propriety of this ruling. Id. at 91, 166 Cal. Rptr.
at 299.
105. Id.
106. 56 How. Pr. 125 (N.Y. 1878); see text accompanying notes 77-85 supra.
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cludes 'codicil,'" the term will is not synonymous with that of codicil.
According to Simpson, quoted with approval in Hering, "'in the term
will, shall be embraced all codicils to a will, so that wherever the word
will is used it shall have the same effect as if it had been written "a will
and all codicils to it" to avoid the necessity of a repetition.' ",107
The court also noted that this interpretation of section 75 is in ac-
cord with the earlier decisions in Schnoor and Shute, which empha-
sized the distinction between a will and a codicil. Unless the codicil
expressly revokes the will, or is wholly inconsistent with it, the codicil
does not operate as a revocation of the earlier will for purposes of sec-
tion 75. 108 The court in Hering concluded that "section 75 applies only
to a revoked will, rather than a portion of the will,"' 0 9 and that "the
common law rule, that revocation of a codicil leaves the original will
intact, still prevails in this State.""10
Present Status of the California Rule
California courts have limited the operation of California's anti-
revival statute to cases in which a prior will executed by the testator
was entirely revoked by a subsequent instrument, either because of an
express revocation clause or because the later instrument contained dis-
positive provisions that were wholly inconsistent with those of the prior
will. The courts purport to distinguish between revocation by a subse-
quent will and revocation by codicil, applying section 75 only to the
former situation, but it seems clear that the underlying basis for the
distinction is total as opposed to partial revocation. The test for the
application of section 75 is whether the two instruments are substan-
tially similar; if they are, the anti-revival statute will not be applied
107. Estate of Hering, 108 Cal. App. 3d 88, 93 n.2, 166 Cal. Rptr. 298, 300 n.2 (quoting
In re Simpson, 56 How. Pr. 125, 131 (N.Y. 1878)).
108. Id. at 97, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
109. Id. at 99, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 304 (emphasis in original).
110. Id. at 93, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 300. The court in Hering stated that to hold otherwise
would be tantamount to judicial legislation, revising § 75 "to include words not in the statute
.... .This would "make it read similar to the current New York statute, which now pro-
vides in relevant part, 'If after executing a will the testator executes a later will which
revokes or alters the prior one, a revocation of the later will does not, of itself, revive the
prior will or any provision thereof." Id. at 95, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 302 (quoting N.Y. EST.,
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-4.6(a) (McKinney 1981)) (emphasis the court's). The court did
not refer, however, to Osburn v. Rochester Trust & Safe Co., 209 N.Y. 54, 102 N.E. 571
(1913), in which the court applied the anti-revival statute to a case of partial revocation
many years before the New York statute was revised. See text accompanying notes 67-76
su/pra.
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and, upon a revocation of the later instrument, the earlier instrument
will be given effect.
Under the California rule, therefore, if a testator makes a will
leaving his or her estate to A, then makes a will leaving the estate to B,
and later destroys the second will, section 75 applies and the testator
dies intestate. If, however, a testator makes a will leaving Blackacre to
A and the residue to B, then makes a second will leaving Blackacre to
X and the residue to B, and thereafter revokes the second will, the
courts are likely to denominate the second will a codicil. In that situa-
tion, the anti-revival statute will not be applied, and the provisions of
the first instrument will control the disposition of the testator's
property.
This distinction between will and codicil, or more realistically be-
tween total and partial revocation, apparently derives from an applica-
tion of the common law and ecclesiastical rules regarding the time at
which a revocation is deemed effective. California courts have long
applied the ecclesiastical rule to a total revocation, so that in the first of
the preceding hypotheticals, when the testator executed the second will,
the gift to A was immediately revoked and could not be revived be-
cause of section 75. When the revocation is partial, however, the courts
apply the common law rule, so that the revocation contained in the
later instrument is ambulatory and has no effect until the testator dies
with the later instrument in force. Thus, in the second example, the gift
of Blackacre to A was never effectively revoked, and the anti-revival
statute has no application. The gift to A would only be revoked if the
testator died with the later instrument unrevoked.
This analysis is supported by the Shute court's reasoning:
It is not a question of whether the act of revoking the second will
served to revive or restore the first one, but of whether the act of
executing the second will in and of itself had the effect of revoking
the first will .... "[W]e think that the second instrument was in
effect a codicil and that its execution did not revoke the first
wil. ..
The decedent having intentionally revoked an instrument which
was in practical effect a codicil, no inconsistency remains which nul-
lifies any part of the first will .... "I
In Shute, the possible revocation was by implication, that is, the
two instruments were partially inconsistent;" 2 there was no express
revocation of the earlier will or any of its provisions. The court in Her-
111. Estate of Shute, 55 Cal. App. 2d 573, 577-79, 131 P.2d 54, 57 (1942) (quoting Estate
of Schnoor, 4 Cal. 2d 590, 592, 51 P.2d 424, 425-26 (1935)).
112. 55 Cal. App. 2d at 577, 131 P.2d at 57 (1942).
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ing, however, indicated that the same rule should apply when there is
an express partial revocation.1 13
The distinction between will and codicil, or between total and par-
tial revocation, as a basis for the operation of section 75, could lead to
absurd results. For example, suppose that a testator having an estate
valued at $1,000,000 makes an initial will leaving $750,000 toA and the
residue to B. Later she executes a second instrument, leaving $750,000
to A and the residue to C. She subsequently tears up the second instru-
ment. Under the Shute case, a change in the disposition of only one
quarter of the estate is a mere codicil, and the first will, deemed unre-
voked, may be probated in its entirety.1 14 If the gift to A is only
$10,000, however, the will-codicil distinction falters: the court may de-
nominate the second instrument a codicil and probate the first will in
its entirety; or, because the change is so extensive, the court may deem
the residuary gift to B to have been revoked at the time of the execu-
tion of the second instrument, thereby causing the residue to pass by
intestacy. Arguably, under the rationale of Hering, the revocation of
the residuary gift was never effective, and the anti-revival statute
should not be applied, leaving the first will entirely intact.1 15
The only qualitative distinction between the preceding hypotheti-
cal and the facts of Hering is the testator's intent. In the hypothetical,
there is no evidence of the testator's intent other than substantially in-
consistent dispositions; in Hering, there was credible, although possibly
inadmissible, 16 testimony that the testator intended that the provisions
of the earlier will be reinstated.
The key to the question of revival should be the testator's intent.
Nevertheless, the California anti-revival statute applies without regard
to the actual or probable intent of the testator. California courts, to
effect the testator's intent and avoid intestacy as much as possible, have
carved out an exception to the operation of the statute based on the
illogical distinction between total and partial revocation.
All solutions to the problems of revival, both judicial and legisla-
113. Estate of Hering, 108 Cal. App. 3d 88, 98, 166 Cal. Rptr. 298, 304 (1980).
114. The court in Shute noted that "the provisions of the second will were not inconsis-
tent with those of the first insofar as nearly three-fourths of the estate is concerned," and
held that the second will should be treated as a codicil. 55 Cal. App. 2d 573, 578, 131 P.2d
54, 57 (1942).
115. The court in Hering stated that there can be no revocation for purposes of § 75
without either an express revocation or wholly inconsistent provisions, neither of which is
present in this example. 108 Cal. App. 3d 88, 97, 166 Cal. Rptr. 298, 303 (1980).
116. If § 75 were deemed applicable, such evidence would be inadmissible, and the trial
court so ruled. See notes 34, 104 supra.
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tive, have been found wanting.' 17
The primary problem with the common law rule of "automatic
revival," under which revocation of the second instrument automati-
cally leaves the first will in force, is that it may thwart the decedent's
intention to die intestate. It may restore and give effect to a will that
the decedent had expressly revoked, 1 8 thus disregarding the testator's
manifest desires."19
The major criticism leveled at the ecclesiastical rule, which gives
effect to the intention of the testator in determining whether to revive
an earlier and revoked will, is that it effectively allows the validity of a
will to be established by extrinsic evidence.' 20 Allowing extrinsic evi-
dence, however, may allow fraud. The framers of the New York anti-
revival legislation posited the dangers of admitting parol evidence as
the primary rationale for the adoption of the statute: "[Tlhe admission
of parol evidence in any case to ascertain the intentions of the deceased
is contrary to the whole spirit and policy of the statute of wills, and is
calculated to let in all the mischiefs which its salutory provisions were
framed to prevent."' 2' Thus, the primary purpose of the anti-revival
statute is the prevention of fraud.
The operation of the statute, however, may invite fraud. Suppose
that a testator dies leaving a will that gives all his property to A, but
when this will is offered for probate, the testator's next of kin produces
evidence that a later will had been executed that left the estate to B.
The second will is not in existence, but may be established by the testi-
mony of a single witness for the purpose of establishing revocation of
the earlier will. The testator is thus deemed to have died intestate, and,
under the anti-revival statute, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to
prove otherwise. 122
117. It has been suggested that "[n]o rule can be worked out which will avoid the dan-
gers of oral evidence on the one hand and which will give effect to the actual intention of the
testator in the particular case, on the other." 2 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 3, § 21.55, at
443.
118. 2 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 3, § 21.54, at 438, 443; Ferrier, supra note 3, at 267-
68, 271.
119. ATKINSON, supra note 27, § 92, at 477.
120. 2 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 3, § 21.54, at 443.
121. Report of Revisers of N.Y. Statutes of 1827-1828, pt. II, c. VI, § 61 in 3 N.Y. Rev.
Stat. app. 633-34 (2d ed. 1836), quoted in Ferrier, supra note 3, at 267.
122. See Estate of Bassett, 196 Cal. 576, 238 P. 666 (1925); see also In re Andrews' Will,
88 N.Y.S.2d 32,38 (1949), in which the New York Surrogate's Court, confronted with such a
situation, stated: "It is a matter of important public policy that a testator should not be
exposed to the frustration of his testamentary provisions by the too facile acceptation of oral
testimony to the effect that his will had bean revoked by a later alleged, but missing, will
under some such circumstances as those by which we are confronted in the present instance.
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A rule that fails to effect the intentions of testators, that forces
courts to draw arbitrary distinctions to prevent its operation, 23 and
that may promote fraud should be abandoned. Although there may be
no ideal solution to the revival problem, the dangers that California's
statute seeks to obviate are less than the evils that it fosters. A variation
of the ecclesiastical rule should be substituted for California's present
anti-revival statute.
Such legislation might take the form of Uniform Probate Code
section 2-509,124 which constitutes a limited revival doctrine.125 Under
this section, if a testator executes a second will, which totally or par-
tially, either by express terms or by implication, revokes a prior will,
and thereafter revokes the second will by some physical act, such as
tearing or burning, then a presumption arises that the first will is still
revoked, either in whole or in part. Extrinsic evidence, however, is ad-
missible to rebut this presumption, either in the form of a testator's
contemporaneous or subsequent statements that he or she intended the
first will to be effective, or as evidence of the circumstances surround-
ing the revocation of the second will. 126 This principle applies regard-
less of whether the second instrument is denominated a will or a
A person, having duly executed his will, should ... be able to feel some sense of security
and reassurement as to safely reposing confidence in probate courts to protect his solemn
directions in relation to the posthumous devolution of his earthly possessions. This is espe-
cially true in a case where (as here) neither the alleged revoking instrument, nor a proven
copy thereof, is produced." See also Evans, Comments on the Probate Code of California, 19
CALIF. L. REV. 602, 611-12 (1931); Ferrier, supra note 3, at 272-73.
123. See text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
124. Uniform Probate Code § 2-509 provides as follows: "(a) If a second will which,
had it remained effective at death, would have revoked the first will in whole or in part, is
thereafter revoked by acts under Section 2-507, the first will is revoked in whole or in part
unless it is evident from the circumstances of the revocation of the second will or from
testator's contemporary or subsequent declarations that he intended the first will to take
effect as executed. (b) If a second will which, had it remained effective at death, would have
revoked the first will in whole or in part, is thereafter revoked by a third will, the first will is
revoked in whole or in part, except to the extent it appears from the terms of the third will
that the testator intended the first will to take effect."
125. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-509, Comment. The issue of revival was the subject
of some dispute at the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Some Reporters suggested that, because the Code facilitates the execution of wills, revival
should not be permitted in the absence of a re-execution of the revoked will or the execution
of a new will incorporating the revoked will by reference. Other Reporters advanced the
view that a testator's clear intent ought to be given effect, even if this involves the admission
of parol evidence. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE SECOND TENTATIVE DRAFT § 2-508, Comment at 55 (Fourth
Working Draft 1968). The latter view was ultimately adopted as § 2-509.
126. R. Effiand, Wills.- Execution, Deposit And Contractual Arrangements, UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL § 2.10, at 25-26 (1972).
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codicil. Thus, if a testator makes a will and then a subsequent codicil
that revokes part of the will, and he or she later destroys the codicil, the
first will may be probated in its entirety if it is evident, either from the
testator's statements or the general circumstances, that the testator in-
tended the entire original will to be effective. 2 7
The adoption of the Uniform Probate Code provision would obvi-
ate many of the difficulties faced by the California courts in the partial
revocation cases. For example, in Estate of Hering,12 8 the court could
have admitted the oral statements made by the decedent to his attorney
indicating that he intended his earlier will to stand and, on the basis of
this evidence of the testator's intent, could have rationally concluded
that the presumption of prior revocation had been overcome. In Estate
of Shute,129 the two instruments' substantial similarity could be inter-
preted as indicating the testator's intent that his original will be given
effect. Substantial dissimilarity between the two instruments could be
interpreted as indicating the testator's intent that the original will not
be given effect.
The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code recognized the dangers
inherent in the admission of extrinsic evidence to establish the testator's
intent, but determined that the use of extrinsic evidence to establish
intent in the revival situation is justified for several reasons:
(1) [S]uch evidence is admissible in any case involving revocation by
act in order to prove that the act itself is intended as a revocation;' 30
(2) in many states the same evidence could be used to establish de-
pendent relative revocationl 3t and thus allow probate of the second
will as unrevoked;' 32 and (3) there is general understanding among
127. Id.
128. 108 Cal. App. 3d 88, 166 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1980). See notes 103-14 & accompanying
text supra.
129. 55 Cal. App. 2d 573, 131 P.2d 54 (1942). See notes 94-102 & accompanying text
supra.
130. Revocation of a will generally requires some evidence of an intention to revoke on
the part of the testator. Because a physical act is inherently ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is
admissible to show the accompanying intent to revoke. See ATKINSON, supra note 27, § 88,
at 454.
131. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is employed by courts to give effect
to a will when a testator has purportedly revoked that will, either by physical act or subse-
quent instrument, while laboring under a mistake of law or fact. Finding that the revocation
was dependent upon the existence of the situation as the testator believed it to be, courts
applying this doctrine will hold that the will is not revoked. Id.
132. See, e.g., In re Albur's Estate, 18 Wis. 2d 340, 118 N.W.2d 919 (1963), in which
the court held that the revocation of a second will, made on the erroneous assumption that a
first will would be thereby revived, was not to be given effect under the theory of dependent
relative revocation. A similar result was reached in Estate of Thompson, 185 Cal. 763, 198
P. 795 (1921).
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non-lawyers that the earlier will, still intact, is good if the revoking
instrument is destroyed. 133
The testator's intent would be best served by a statute that avoids
both the arbitrary distinctions drawn by California courts between wills
and codicils and partial intestacy, the result under the current New
York law.
Conclusion
This Article has traced the history of the California anti-revival
statute and analyzed its application by the California courts. The Arti-
cle concludes that the statute has resulted in anomalous distinctions,
may thwart the intentions of testators, and is conducive to fraud. Be-
cause of this, California Probate Code section 75 should be repealed
and Uniform Probate Code section 2-509 should be adopted.
133. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNI-
FORM PROBATE CODE § 2-508, Comment at 97 (Third Working Draft 1967).
[Vol. 33
